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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and FiVA
B. WEL·CHMAN,
Plaintvffs and Appellants,
Case No.

vs.
MERRILL J. WOOD, d/b/a Wood

9160

Realty Company, and MILO D.
CARTER,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice
of plaintiffs' action for damages for breach of a contract
of agency, or in the alternative, for restitution of a commission paid to defendants by plaintiffs. The order of
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dismissal was made at the trial of the action, following
statements of plaintiffs' counsel to the jury and to the
court of plaintiffs' proposed evidence.
This constitutes the second appeal by plaintiffs in
the action, the case having come up on appeal from a
summary judgment, as case number 8718, and a decision
in plaintiffs' favor having been rendered therein on
March 28, 1959 (337 P2d 410).
Throughout this brief, R indicates pages of the
record, and D pages of the deposition that has been
published in the action. Italicized emphasis throughout
has been added by appellants. The following statement
of facts was taken from appellants' brief in the first
appeal, to which has now been added additional details
bearing upon the points now before this court.

STATEJ\1:ENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs had a pressing need for money, in order
to pay debts. They decided to sell their house to raise
it (D. 34, 35). Accordingly, they entered into a written
listing agreen1ent with defendant Wood on 1\iarch 8,
1956 (D. 4; R. 43). This listing agreen1ent did notrequire a trade of properties. It provided, in handwriting,
"Will exchange for money," and in the fine print on the
reverse side was the provision, " . . . If I agree to an
exchange of said property, ... " (R. 43).
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Wood assigned his salesman, defendant Carter, to
seek a buyer (D. 15). Defendants did not present plaintiffs with any offer until April 28, 1956. On that day
Carter came to plaintiffs with an offer from a couple by
the name of Granger to exchange their residence valued
at $10,000 for plaintiffs' residence valued at $21,000, with
the balance, after adjusting equities, to be paid to plaintiffs by Grangers in monthly installments, under a real
estate contract (D. 14, 9).
Plaintiffs were at first unwilling to accept Grangers'
offer because it would not produce the cash that they
sorely needed (R. 1; D. 14, 27, 32). Carter assured them
that they would obtain sufficient cash from the transaction because defendants could make available to them
$8,600 under an F.H.A. loan on the Granger house,
which would result in almost $3,500 net cash for plain~
tiffs, and defendants could sell their proposed real estate
contract with Grangers for at least $4,000 cash (R. 1;
D. 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 35, 36). Plaintiffs expressed concern that defendants might not be able to make available
these sums.
They asked Carter a number of times if he was sure
that defendants could get such a loan and could sell such
a real estate contract for at least $4,000 - that if ~e
wasn't, it would be better not to sell the house (D. 27;
R. 29-31). Carter assured them that there was nothing
to worry about. He said, "I will see that you get this
loan. I .will sell your contract for no less than four
thousand dollars, and thereby you can attain your
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money." (R. 29). He discussed the matter with Wood
over the phone and promised them that these amounts
would be forthcoming (R. 1; D. 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 36, 37).
Solely in reliance upon Carter's representations,
promises and assurances, and in consideration thereof,
plaintiffs agreed with defendants to make the trade with
Grangers (R. 1; D. 9, 14, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39). Defendants
thereby became entitled to receive a commission of $1,050
from plaintiffs plus an additional commission of almost
$500 from Grangers, none of which they would have
been entitled to otherwise unless they had produced a
buyer who would "exchange for rnoney" (R. 1, 31; D. 10,

11, 37). Plaintiffs acting in reliance upon this oral
modification completed the transaction 'vith Grangers
and subsequently paid the commission to defendants, so
that plaintiffs fully performed everything that they
agreed to perform under the new agreen1ent ·with defendants (R. 2; D. 10, 11, 12, 32, 37, 39, -!2~ 43). B:T completing the trade with the third party, Grangers, plaintiffs materially and irrevocably changed their position.
Defendants failed to 1nake available to plaintiffs any
F.H.A. financing, because of a substantial defect in the
foundation of the house (Grangers') to be financed, and
failed to sell the Granger contract for $4,000, because
they found no one who would buy it at that price (R. 2~
D. 30, 17, 19, 37). As a result, plaintiffs incurred heavy
damages (R. 2, 3; D. 20-24, 3l, 38, 39).
4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED EVIDENCE SHOWS AN
AGREEMENT BY DEFENDANTS TO OBTAIN PARTICULAR RESULTS, REGARDLESS OF THE RISK OF IMPOSSIBILITY.
POINT II
IT IS A QUESTION OF FACT, FOR THE JURY, TO
DETERMINE WHE'THER OR NOT PERFORMANCE WAS
IMPOSSIBLE.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs are entitled to have their proposed evidence, and every fair inference fairly arising therefrom,
considered in the light most favorable to them, in determining whether or not this nonsuit was proper. 53 Am
Jur 264, Trial, §§327, 313, 314.
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED EVIDENCE SHOWS AN
AGREEMENT BY DEFENDANTS TO OBTAIN PARTICULAR RESULTS, REGARDLESS OF THE RISK OF IMPOSSIBILITY.

In Williston on Contracts (Revised Student Edition) 908, §1934, it is stated:
"A promise impossible of performance may
be binding.
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" 'A man may contract that a future event
shall come to pass over which he has no, or only
limited, power.' Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99,
104, 35 S. Ct. 94, 59 A. Ed. 147. 'If the occurren~e
of an event which is not within hu1nan control 1s
in terms promised the words are interpreted as
a promise to be a~swerable for proximate harm
unless the event occurs.' Rest., Contracts, §457
Comment b. Not only rnay such a promise be
binding in case of supervening impossibility but
it also may be binding though performance was
impossible when the promise was made. Indeed,
such promises are common . . .''
The trial court and defendants' counsel have characterized the question of assumption of risk of impossibility of performance as a question of "warranty" (R. 15,
19, 20, 36). Such designation seems appropriate and will
be followed somewhat by appellants herein.
As Arnell Welchman recalls the conversation on
April 18, 1956, Carter 1nade repeated "assurances" that
the particular results would be forthcoming. " . A_ ssure",
"insure", "guarantee" and "warrant" are essentially
synonymous. A definite and certain assurance to obtain
a particular result can in law constitute a warranty.
The trial Court ruled that "a statement of events
that can occur, that will occur, but all futu're" does not
constitute a warranty (R. 20). The court said that he
does not believe that Carter's "statements of assurance
and the statement that he did say that this could be done"
has legal effect of warranty (R. 20). The court seemed
to disregard the definition of warranty, which includes
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certain promises that future events will come to pass, as
well . as certain representations as to present facts.
Black's Law Dictionary (3d Ed), at page 1832, defines
warranty, as used in contracts, as, "An undertaking or
stipulation, in writing, or verbally, that a certain fact
in relation to the subject of a contract is or shall be as
it is ·stated or promised to be." See the Sales Act, UCA,
1953, 60-1-12, which in defining express warranty declares that, "Any affirmation of fact or any promise" is
a warranty under certain circumstances.
It is stated at 46 Am J ur 494, Sales, §313, Express
Warranties, Generally :
" ... A seller may give a warranty against a
future event. It is to be noted that the statutory
definition of an express warranty includes any
promise of the seller relating to the goods. To
constitute an express warranty, the term "war.,;
rant" need not be used; no technical set of words
is required, and a warranty may be inferred from
the affirmation of a fact which induces the purchase and on which the buyer relies and on which
the seller intended that he should so do. It is not
necessary that the warranty be in writing; a valid
warranty may be made orally, and, if so made1
will be given the same effect as a written one, ..."
Arnell .Welchman could not recall the exact language
used by Garter, but he is definite and certain that such
language constituted repeated assurances that the money
would be forthcoming from the sources promised. Plaintiffs made clear to him that an exchange of properties
would do them no good unless it produced money. With

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

knowledge of this,· Carter gave them assurances that
defendants would obtain money for them in such ways:
R. 16, line 26: " ... he at that time assured
us ..."
R. 17, line 9: " ... He assured us he could."
R. 17, line 28 : "He did guarantee to me a
certain sum.''
R. 18, line 5 : "That is what they assured us."
R. 18, line 20: "That was the figure he had
assured us he could do- that was the figure he
promised us he would be able to do, he assured
us, because we were worried. We. asked him a
number of times if he was sure, and if he wasn't,
the way things stand, it would be better not to
sell the house."
R. 25, line 2: "Mr. Carter assured us ... "
R. 29, line 16: "[Carter said] 'I will see that
you get this loan.' He said that 'I will sell your
contract for no less than four thousand dollars
and thereby you can attain your n1onev.' That is
the thing I questioned in the whole de~l. He said
he could do this and that, and I doubted because
I was lacking experience in the matters, but he
said he could, so I took his word for it; ... "
R. 31, line 14: "He said that he could sell the
contract for no less than four thousand dollars
and he said that he would be able to finance th~
home. He assured us."

8
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These statements must be viewed in reference to the
entire situation between the parties, and particularly in
light of plaintiffs' statements to Carter of their ultimate,
and essential, purpose. It is a matter of properly interpreting the new, orally modified, contract. 12 Am Jur,
Contracts, sets out certain well-recognized rules of interpretation, as follows:
At page 754, §231 : ". . . The language of a
prmnisor is to be interpreted in the sense in
which he knew or in which he had reason to suppose it was understood by the promisee. Stated
in slightly different words, the language and acts
of a party to a contract are to receive such a
construction as at the time he supposed the other
party would give them or such a construction as
the other party was fairly justified in giving to
them, and he will not at a later time be permitted
to give them a different operation in consequence
of some mental reservation.... "
At page 776, §242: "There can be no doubt
that the court may look beyond the form into
which the parties have cast their agreement. The
spirit and purpose of an agreement as well as
its letter must be regarded in the interpretation
and application thereof. In fact, it is the substance of an agreement rather than its form the spirit rather than the letter - which must
control its interpretation. . . . "
At page 777, §242: " ... All contracts must
be interpreted with reference to their subject
matter. . . . As an aid to ascertaining what the
parties intended and understood by the words
employed, the object in making the agreement
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may be taken into consideration. · Schofield v ·
Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst. 85. Utah, 281, 39 P.
( 2d) 342, 96 A.L.R. 1083 ; Anderson v. Great
Eastern Casualty Co. 51 Utah 78, 168 P. 966. · · ·
It is always of much importance in the inte~preta
tion of a contract upon which doubt ans.es to
ascertain what was the attitude of the parties to
the subject and to find out what was their main
purpose and object in making it. If this can be
done, the terms of the contract will be so interpreted as to promote the main purpose, if the
language employed will fairly permit such construction. . . ."
. At page 785, §247: " ... In interpreting an
agreement, a court should, to the best of its
ability, place itself in the situation occupied by
the parties when the agreement was made and
avail itself of the same light which the parties
possessed when the agreement was made so as to
judge of the meaning of the words and of the
correct application of the langauge to the things
described. . . . General or indefinite terms contained in a contract may be explained or restricted by the circumstances surrounding its execution. The scope and application of most words
vary according to the nature of the subject under
discussion and the circumstances under which
they are used. "
At page 792, §250: " ... Where the language
of an agreement is contradictory, obscure, or anlbiguous, or where its n1eaning is doubtful so that
it is susceptible of two constructions, one ~f which
rnakes it fair, custon1ary, and such as prudent
men would naturally execute, while the other
makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable rnen would not be likely to enter into, the
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interpretation which makes a rational and probable agreement must be preferred. The interpretation of any instrument ought to be broad
enough to allow it to operate fairly and justly
under all the conditions to which it may apply.
A court will not place an unjust interpretation
upon a contract, unless the terms thereof compel
it to do so .... "
In Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co.,
160 Ill. 85, 43 N.E. 77 4, the principle is stated:
"Courts will seek to discover and give effect
to the intention of the parties, in construing a
contract, so that performance may be enforced
according ot the sense in which they mutually
understood it at the time it was made, and greater
regard is to be had to their clear intent than to
any particular words which they may have used
to express it."
It is respectfully submitted that application of the
foregoing legal principles to plaintiffs' proposed evidence presents substantially more than a scintilla of evidence of a material nature and that, accordingly, the
dismissal was improper and a jury question is presented.
POINT II
IT IS A QUESTION OF FACT, FOR THE JURY, TO
DETERMINE WHE THER OR NOT PERFORMANCE WAS
IMPOSSIBLE.
1

It is immaterial whether or not defendants assumed
the risk that their performance might .be impossible if
in fact performance was possible.
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Paragraph 2 of the First Cause of Action of the
complaint alleges the assumption by defendants of the
risk that their performance might be impossible. It does
not allege that performance was in fact impossible. Paragraph 4 alleges that defendants failed to make available
to plaintiffs FHA financing because of a substantial
defect in the foundation of the house to be financed, and
failed to sell the Uniform Real Estate Contract for
$4,000, because no one would buy it at that price. It is
not alleged that the foundation defect vvas not correctible
or that the contract could not be sold for an amount not
substantially less than $4,000.
It is true that it was impossible to obtain an FHA
loan on the house as the foundation then stood, but it
is nowhere stated that the defect was not correctible.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs have treated, and now treat, this
portion of the April 28th agreement as having become
impossible for defendants to perform. They do not so
treat the other promise.
Arnell Welchman was willing to accept somewhat
less than $4,000 for the real estate contract (D. 16), and
in the opening statement to the jury, plaintiffs' counsel
stated that plaintiffs' evidence would show that the
contract was actually resold for over $3,800 by the 1nan
who ultimately bought it from plaintiffs. (R. 12). Under
defendants' general denial it, therefore, remains an issue
of fact, for the jury, to detennine whether or not performance of such portion of defendants' promises, with
only an unsubstantial variation, was possible. See Restatement of Contracts, §463.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' proposed evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs, does show an agreement
by defendants to obtain particular results, regardless of
the risk of impossibility.
It is a question of fact, for the jury, to determine
whether or not performance of at least a portion of
defendants promises was possible.
Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully submit that the
order of dismissal should be vacated.

VICTOR A. SPENCER
Attorney for PlaintiJffs and
Appellants
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